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1. Introduction 
Financial crises of the magnitude that caused the ongoing Great Recession are relatively 
rare but dramatic and socially costly events. As was the case with the 1990s emerging 
markets crises or the Great Depression of the 1930s, the Great Recession was preceded by 
prolonged booms in credit, economic activity and asset prices, followed by a sharp, sudden 
crash. This observation has made policymakers wary of periods of rapid credit expansion 
and surging asset prices, and has led to the view that financial regulation is in urgent need of 
revamping to incorporate a macroprudential focus to contain systemic excessive borrowing in 
the expansionary phase of the credit cycle. Research on the development of the 
macrofinancial framework that is required to construct quantitative models to inform the 
design of this new regulation is at an early stage. We report in this paper on some of the key 
lessons that follow from the research we are conducting to contribute to fill this gap (see 
Bianchi and Mendoza (2011) for further details). 
Research on this topic is at an early stage primarily because macroeconomics has a lot of 
work to do in producing sound quantitative models that can incorporate realistic mechanisms 
explaining the dynamics that turn typical business cycles into full-fledged financial crises. In 
particular, a good model of macroprudential regulation should pass two litmus tests: first, the 
model should provide a plausible quantitative explanation of the stylised facts that 
characterise actual financial crises, and of the frequency with which these crises occur; 
second, the model should provide a framework for relating policy instruments to the actions 
of economic agents in a way that can capture the effects by which policy actions taken in 
“good times” alter the features of financial crises in “bad times.” These are challenging tasks, 
because they involve studying the dynamics of complex nonlinear intertemporal models with 
financial frictions using global methods that can approximate accurately the incentives (or the 
lack thereof) of market participants to take prudential action in the face of potentially serious 
financial risks. 
We construct our framework starting with a theoretical foundation based on the theory of 
financial crises postulated by Irving Fisher in his classic 1933 article on the Debt-Deflation 
Theory of Great Depressions. Following Mendoza (2010), the engine of our model is a 
borrowing constraint that limits an individual’s borrowing ability for consumption smoothing 
and for working capital financing to a fraction of the market-determined value of the assets 
the individual can post as collateral. When the constraint binds, agents fire-sale assets, 
which leads to a spiralling decline in asset prices and borrowing ability that can greatly 
amplify the effects of the underlying shocks driving business cycles, just as Fisher described 
in his work. 
The key step in extending the model to make it useful for studying macroprudential policy is 
to recognise that the borrowing constraint introduces a systemic pecuniary externality in 
credit markets, which arises because of the Fisherian feedback loop between asset prices 
and collateral constraints. During booms, increases in asset prices relax collateral constraints 
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and boost output. As leverage increases, a small shock can trigger fire sales, a collapse in 
asset prices and a deep recession. During both the boom and crash phases, however, 
individual agents fail to internalise the implications of their own actions for market-determined 
asset prices. In particular, by failing to internalise the Fisherian deflation dynamics they might 
face in bad times, they choose to borrow “too much” in good times. 
We analyse the case for macroprudential regulation by considering how a social planner who 
internalises the feedback loop between leverage, asset prices and collateral constraints can 
enhance financial stability and make everyone better off. In particular, we answer two key 
questions: first, what are the effects of macroprudential regulation on the frequency and 
magnitude of financial crises? Second, what are the features of the policy instruments that 
are necessary to implement the planner’s constrained-efficient allocations?  
We answer these questions using a nonlinear dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model 
of asset prices and business cycles with credit frictions. As in the model of Mendoza (2010), 
our model provides a unified framework to study business cycles and financial crises since 
the latter are events that occur with positive probability and are anticipated by agents during 
regular business cycles. In the model, collateral assets take the form of an asset in fixed 
aggregate supply (eg land). Private agents take the price of this asset as given, producing 
the systemic pecuniary externality mentioned above. The social planner faces an identical 
set of feasible credit positions, but internalises the effects of debt choices on future asset 
prices and wages. 
When the constraint becomes binding, production plans are also affected, because working 
capital financing is needed in order to pay for a fraction of labour costs, and working capital 
loans are also subject to the collateral constraint. As a result, when the credit constraint 
binds output falls, because of a sudden increase in the effective cost of labour. This affects 
dividend streams and therefore equilibrium asset prices, feeding back again to the real side 
of the economy and to credit market access. 
We calibrate the decentralised competitive equilibrium to US data and ask how the 
allocations and prices that characterise it compare with those of the social planner. Our 
findings suggest that there is significant potential to enhance financial stability and improve 
social welfare with the introduction of macroprudential regulation, but they also highlight the 
challenges that policymakers face in the design of optimal macroprudential regulation.  
In our experiments, the probability of a financial crash is reduced from 3% in the 
decentralised equilibrium to less than 1% in the constrained-efficient equilibrium. Asset 
prices drop about 25% in a typical crisis in the decentralised equilibrium, compared with 5% 
in the constrained-efficient equilibrium. Output drops about 50% more in the decentralised 
equilibrium, because the fall in asset prices reduces access to working capital financing. The 
social planner can induce the decentralised economy to replicate exactly the constrained-
efficient allocations by imposing taxes on debt and dividends of about 1% and –0.5% on 
average, respectively. While in our model this is possible, we also recognise that attaining 
the same level of optimality with actual macroprudential regulation is a daunting task. Our 
model is highly stylised, featuring a representative agent with a single borrowing constraint, 
one source of exogenous shocks, and with perfectly informed agents and regulators. Further 
work needs to develop richer models to relax these unrealistic assumptions. 
2. Model 
The model features a representative firm-household that takes production, employment and 
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where  t c  represents consumption and  t n  represents labour supply. Each household can 
combine land and labour services purchased from other households to produce final goods 
using a production technology such that  ) , ( t t t h k F y   where  t k represents individual land 
holdings,  t h represents labour demand and  t   is a productivity shock that follows a Markov 
process.  
The budget constraint faced by the representative firm-household is: 
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where  1  t b denotes holdings of one-period, non-state-contingent discount bonds at the 
beginning of date t,  t q  is the market price of land,  t R is the real interest rate, and  t w is the 
wage rate.  
Following Mendoza (2010), private agents face a collateral constraint that limits total debt, 
including both intertemporal debt and atemporal working capital loans, not to exceed a 
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The interest rate is assumed to be exogenous. This is equivalent to assuming that the 
economy is a price-taker in world credit markets. This assumption is adopted for simplicity, 
but is also in line with the evidence indicating that in the era of financial globalisation even 
the US risk-free rate has been significantly influenced by outside factors, such as the surge 
in reserves in emerging economies and the persistent collapse of investment rates in 
Southeast Asia after 1998. 
Asset prices and wages are determined in the model’s general equilibrium. On the side of 
wages, when the collateral constraint does not bind, wages are simply determined by the 
market-clearing condition  2 '( ) ( , ) tt t t Gh w FK h   . When the collateral constraint becomes 
binding, demand for labour decreases since the effective cost of hiring increases and this 
reduces equilibrium wages and employment. On the side of land prices, the demand for land 
is driven by the effects of technology shocks on future returns for land and on the stochastic 
discount factor adjusted to consider the shadow value of land as collateral for debt. A binding 
collateral constraint triggers a fire sale of land and a substantial drop in asset prices as 
households rush to reduce their land holdings to repay their debt. This further tightens the 
collateral constraint generating extra rounds of drops in labour and land demand, which feed 
again into asset prices.  
We study the efficiency of the competitive equilibrium by considering a benevolent social 
planner who maximises the agents’ utility subject to the resource constraint, the collateral 
constraint and the same menu of credit possibilities of the competitive equilibrium. In 
particular, we consider a social planner that is constrained to have the same “borrowing 
ability” (the same market-determined value of collateral assets  K b q t t ) , (   at every given 
state as agents in the decentralised equilibrium), but with the key difference that the planner 
internalises the effects of its borrowing decisions on the market prices of assets and labour.  BIS Papers No 60  69
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The comparable Euler equation for the decentralised equilibrium is given by 
. ) 1 ( ' ) ( ' t t t t u E R t u      Notice that there is an extra term in the Euler equation for the 
constrained planner’s problem. This extra term  1 1   t t   represents the additional marginal 
benefit of savings considered by the social planner at date t, because the planner takes into 
account how an extra unit of bond holdings alters the tightness of the credit constraint 
through its effects on the prices of land and labour at t+1.  
Note that, since  0 / 1 1      t t b q  and  0 / 1 1      t t b w ,  1  t is the difference of two opposing 
effects and hence its sign is in principle ambiguous. The term  0 / 1 1      t t b q  is strictly 
positive, because an increase in net worth increases demand for land and land is in fixed 
supply. The term  0 / 1 1      t t b w  is positive, because the effective cost of hiring labour 
increases when the collateral constraint binds, reducing labour demand and pushing wages 
down. We found, however, that the value of  1  t  is positive in all our quantitative 
experiments with baseline parameter values and variations around them, and this is because 
1 1 /     t t b q  is large and positive when the credit constraint binds due the effects of the 
Fisherian debt-deflation mechanism.  
The above expression for the planner’s Euler equation for bonds also shows some of the key 
ingredients of the macroprudential policies necessary to correct the externality. One crucial 
element is to introduce a wedge in the Euler equation for bonds to reduce the incentive to 
overleverage. We show in Bianchi and Mendoza (2011) how to implement this wedge with a 
tax on debt (see Bianchi (2010) for the use of capital requirements and loan-to-value (LTV) 
ratios as equivalent policy measures).  
3. Quantitative  analysis 
The calibration and the solution method are described in detail in Bianchi and Mendoza 
(2011). To demonstrate the impact of macroprudential regulation, we construct an event 
analysis of financial crises with simulated data obtained by performing long stochastic time-
series simulations of the competitive and constrained-efficient economies, as well as a fixed-
price economy that corresponds to a competitive equilibrium in which the credit constraint 
becomes  1 1 /      t t t t k q h w R b    where q is the average price (that is, effectively this 
economy has a credit constraint but no Fisherian deflation). A financial crisis episode is 
defined as a period in which the credit constraint binds and this causes a decrease in credit 
that exceeds one standard deviation of the first-difference of credit. 
The first important result of the event analysis is that the incidence of financial crises is 
significantly higher in the competitive equilibrium. We calibrated   so that the competitive 
economy experiences financial crises with a long-run probability of 3.0%. But financial crises 
occur in the constrained-efficient economy only with 0.9% probability in the long run. Thus, 
the credit externality increases the frequency of financial crises by a factor of 3.33. 
The second important result is that financial crises are more severe in the competitive 
equilibrium. This is illustrated in the event analysis plots shown in Figure 1. The event 
windows are for total credit, consumption, labour, output, TFP and land prices, all expressed 
as deviations from long-run averages. These event dynamics are shown for the 
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constructed so that it captures a median crisis in the decentralised equilibrium and such that 
the path for the constrained-efficient and fixed-price economies is simulated using the same 




The features of financial crises at date t in the competitive economy are in line with the 
results in Mendoza (2010): the debt-deflation mechanism produces financial crises 
characterised by sharp declines in credit, consumption, asset prices and output. In this 
sense, our model aims to comply with the first litmus test we posed in the Introduction. 
The five macro variables illustrated in the event windows show similar dynamics across the 
three economies in the two years before the financial crisis. When the crisis hits, however, 
the collapses observed in the competitive equilibrium are much larger. Credit falls about 
20 percentage points more, and two years after the crisis the credit stock of the competitive 
equilibrium remains 10 percentage points below that of the social planner. Consumption, 
asset prices, and output also fall much more sharply in the competitive equilibrium than in the 
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(–16% against –5% for consumption and –24% against –7% for land prices). The asset price 
collapse also plays an important role in explaining the more pronounced decline in credit in 
the competitive equilibrium, because it reflects the outcome of the Fisherian deflation 
mechanism. Output falls by 2 percentage points more, and labour falls almost 3 percentage 
points more, because of the higher shadow cost of hiring labour due to the effect of the 
tighter binding credit constraint on access to working capital. 
The dynamics of the debt and dividend taxes around crisis events are shown in Figure 2. The 
debt tax is high relative to its average, at about 2.7%, at t−2 and t−1, and this reflects the 
macroprudential nature of these taxes: their goal is to reduce borrowing so as to mitigate the 
magnitude of the financial crisis if bad shocks occur. At date t the debt tax falls to zero, and it 
rises again at t+1 and t+2 to about 2%. The latter occurs because, being this close to the 
crisis, the economy still remains financially fragile (ie there is still a non-zero probability of 
agents becoming credit-constrained next period).
2 By showing these results illustrating the 
prudential incentives of the taxes that decentralise the planner’s allocations, our model also 




The traditional approach to financial regulation requires the solvency of each and every 
financial institution to be monitored. This microprudential approach has been recently 
questioned in light of the recent period of high turbulence in financial markets worldwide. In 
particular, discussions on international financial reform advocate the need of a 
macroprudential approach. This approach considers how decisions of individual market 
participants affect the whole financial sector and how developments in the financial sector 
can affect the real economy and feed back again into the financial sector. We have described 
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some recent results that evaluate the macroeconomic and welfare effects of this approach in 
a Fisherian model of financial crises. 
Our findings suggest that there are potentially large benefits from adopting a macroprudential 
approach. In fact, in our simulations, the frequency of a financial crash can be reduced about 
threefold and the severity of these episodes is substantially reduced. It is important to note, 
however, that introducing macroprudential regulation does not eliminate the credit cycles in 
the economy nor does it eliminate the probability of a financial crisis. This is consistent with 
the idea that the purpose of macroprudential regulation is not to achieve financial stability per 
se, but to incorporate in the regulatory framework those systemic effects that individual 
institutions ignore in their private calculations of risk. 
We have focused on the time dimension of macroprudential policy (see Borio (2010)). It 
would be interesting to consider a richer heterogeneity that would allow us to study how 
policy instruments should be targeted on different types of institutions and on different forms 
of risk-taking. In the cross-sectional dimension, the choice on how to correlate risks would be 
a key determinant of aggregate exposure and it is an important aspect that we leave for 
future research. 
At the same time, we would like to point out that actual implementation of macroprudential 
policies in financial markets remains a challenging task. For example, we have shown that 
restoring constrained-efficiency requires a tax on debt that increases with the probability of a 
financial crisis. Implementing this policy requires real-time monitoring of the build-up of 
systemic risk in order to appropriately adjust the policy instruments and with a sufficient lead 
to actually have an effect before the crash occurs. Further work on implementation of 
macroprudential policy is a critical avenue for future research. 
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